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Abstract
Some of philosophy's most central concepts, including art,
friendship, and happiness, have been argued to be dual char-
acter concepts. Their main characteristic is that they encode
not only a descriptive dimension but also an independent
normative dimension for categorization. This article intro-
duces the class of dual character concepts and discusses
various accounts of their content and structure. A specific
focus will be placed on their relation to two other classes
of concepts, thick concepts and natural kind concepts. The
study of dual character concepts not only demonstrates
that a wide range of concepts is inherently normative, but
it also reveals new possibilities for investigating gender
biases, generics, and social roles.
1 | WHAT ARE DUAL CHARACTER CONCEPTS?
Most of our concepts seem to be either purely descriptive, e.g., meadow and playing tennis, or purely normative, e.g.,
fantastic and abysmal. The class of thick concepts has long been thought to provide the only exception.1 Thick con-
cepts, such as generous and rude, are substantially descriptive but also involve evaluation.2 Within the past few years,
researchers have begun to investigate a new class of part descriptive, part normative concepts, the so‐called dual
character concepts (Del Pinal & Reuter, 2017; Knobe, Prasada, & Newman, 2013; Leslie, 2015). Dual character con-
cepts are unique in that their descriptive and normative dimensions are related but independent. To illustrate their
properties, take the example of the concept artist. On the one hand, we consider a person to be an artist if certain
descriptive aspects, such as painting pictures for a living, are met. On the other hand, we may also conceive of a per-
son as an artist if she satisfies norms that spell out what we believe an artist should be or should do, for instance, be
committed to creating works of deep esthetic value. Consequently, people can categorize a person as an artist, if she
fulfills the descriptive, or the normative criterion, or both. Note that the normative dimension of artist is not a matter
of being particularly good at being an artist: The set of good artists forms a proper subset of the set of all artists. In
contrast, many people who are committed to creating works of deep esthetic value do not belong to the set of artists
that satisfy its descriptive features.
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1.1 | Which concepts are dual character?
One might initially think that dual character concepts are restricted to social role concepts such as artist, father, or
criminal, and artifact concepts like painting and jazz, which have an undeniable link to the social domain.3 After all,
the most extensive studies of dual character concepts so far have focused on artifact and social role concepts (Knobe
et al., 2013) or social role concepts only (Leslie, 2015; Del Pinal & Reuter, 2015, 2017, ms). Other studies, however,
suggest that some of philosophy's most fundamental concepts may also have a dual character structure: Phillips, De
Freitas, Mott, Gruber, and Knobe (2017) argue that the ordinary concept of happiness has an independent normative
dimension by including a place for moral value (see also Chituc, 2012). Liao, Meskin, and Knobe (n.d.) argue that the
concept art is a dual character concept and thereby provide a new solution to the debate of whether “art” is a
descriptive or evaluative term. Buckwalter, Rose, and Turri (2015) distinguish between thin and thick beliefs, where
a thin belief that p merely involves storing p as information. A thick belief that p, however, requires a person to emo-
tionally endorse p. Although Buckwalter et al. do not argue for belief to be dual character, developing a two‐fold
structure for belief makes room for such an interpretation.4 Work by Newman, De Freitas, and Knobe (2015) suggests
that the notion of self allows for two different dimensions: one descriptive and one that is normatively laden. Thus,
the study of dual character concepts not only is an intriguing research subject in itself but also has wide‐ranging con-
sequences for a host of philosophical and psychological topics.
1.2 | Methods, operationalization, and empirical investigation
From its very beginning, the study of dual character concepts has been empirically grounded, no doubt in large part
due to Knobe et al.'s (2013) work. In their seminal paper on dual character concepts, Knobe et al. propose two dif-
ferent ways to operationalize the notion of a dual character concept. First, the “two‐senses” approach (see also
Machery & Seppälä, 2011) asks us to consider the following two pairs of sentences:
(1a) There is a sense in which she is a scientist [optician]/it is jazz [a table].
(1b) However, when you think about what it really means to be a scientist [optician, jazz, table], you would have to
say that she is not a scientist [optician]/it is not jazz [a table] after all.
(2a) There is a sense in which she is not a scientist [optician]/it is not jazz [a table].
(2b) However, when you think about what it really means to be a scientist [optician, jazz, table], you would have to
say that she is a scientist [optician]/it is jazz [a table] after all.
Most people accept all four statements for scientist and jazz but reject the (b)‐statements for optician and table,
revealing that scientist and jazz but not optician and table encode an independent normative dimension for categori-
zation.5 Aristotle (350 BCE) was perhaps the first philosopher to highlight the dual nature of some concepts when
discussing what it means to be a friend and provided us with a second method of operationalization. Aristotle
famously wrote that we think of people as friends if they are useful or are pleasurable company, although “it is those
who desire the good of the friends for the friends' sake that are most truly [emphasis added] friends” (p. 263). This
passage not only suggests friend to have two independent criteria for its application, but it also exemplifies that
the “true” modifier singles out its normative dimension. Thus, when stating “Federer's second serve is a true piece
of art,” we seem to pick out the normative dimension of the concept art. Empirical studies (Knobe et al., 2013) have
supported the idea that the normative dimension of dual character concepts can be picked out by expressions such as
true friend or true artist, and that its properties can be investigated by examining the acceptability patterns of those
expressions under various manipulations of contextual information (Del Pinal & Reuter, 2017). Providing such contex-
tual information can add an ad hoc normative dimension to concepts that would usually not be judged dual character.
Consider, for instance, a school bus driver who drives recklessly in heavy traffic. Given this background information,
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you might think that a true bus driver makes sure children arrive home safely (see also Leslie, 2015, for a more elab-
orate discussion of this example).
Many of the subsequent studies on dual character concepts (Del Pinal & Reuter, 2015, 2017, ms; Liao et al., n.d.;
Newman, Bloom, & Knobe, 2014; Phillips et al., 2017; Tobia, Newman, & Knobe, ms) apply at least one of these two
methods and aim to support their theoretical claims with empirical data. Even though the application of these
methods has certainly delivered fascinating results, their use is not without challenges. First, the two‐senses method
is arguably too vague concerning the meaning of the term “sense,” which can be interpreted in a wide variety of ways.
Second, the “true‐modifier” approach suffers from the fact that the term “true” has many different meanings and
uses: (a) There is, of course, the standard philosophical sense according to which a proposition like “Snow is white”
is true or false; (b) “true” is often used as a hedge (Lakoff, 1975) as in “A sparrow is a true bird,” where the true‐mod-
ifier highlights that a sparrow not only satisfies the defining features of a bird but also has most prototypical features
of birds. In contrast, a penguin does not look like a typical bird, and hence, many people consider penguins to be
merely technically speaking birds; (c) “true” is also used as an intensifier to raise the standard of application as in, “This
is a true cookie.” Using the true‐modifier in one of these three alternative meanings does not show that we are deal-
ing with dual character concepts: Neither proposition, nor sparrow, nor cookie has an independent normative dimen-
sion for categorization. Given these worries, it is certainly desirable to develop a more comprehensive toolkit for the
investigation of dual character concepts.6
2 | THE NORMATIVITY OF DUAL CHARACTER CONCEPTS
2.1 | The content of the normative dimension
One of the major research questions in the literature on dual character concepts is concerned with identifying their
normative content. Before we discuss three specific accounts, let me first address the more general question of how
we can understand the idea that dual character concepts have a normative dimension for categorization. When we
ask ourselves what a father should do, or in which circumstances one should be happy or angry, we consider these
questions to be normative. Answers to such should‐questions have been argued to lack descriptive import but
instead have an action‐ or reason‐guiding role; i.e., they recommend (or even demand) a certain course of action
or thought.7 Perhaps the most surprising insight about dual character concepts is that for these concepts, an action‐
or reason‐guiding aspect (yet to be specified) takes on a classificatory role. For instance, according to a more tradi-
tional picture, a father is a male biological parent and should be committed to look after his offspring: Whether or
not a man is indeed committed to look after his offspring is irrelevant for classifying him as a father (because it is
merely something a father should do, not what makes him a father). However, dual character concepts seem to work
differently. If a male biological parent does not care about his offspring, there seems to be a sense in which that per-
son is not a father. And conversely, if a person looks after a child that is not his biological offspring, then there is a
sense in which that person is a father. The same cannot be said for concepts that are not dual character: Whatever
one believes a cashier should do, e.g., be committed to processing transactions, care about money, and be polite to
customers, there seems to be no sense in which a person ceases to be a cashier if s/he does not satisfy such action‐
guiding norms. Given these considerations, how should we specify the normative content that takes on a “classifica-
tory life on its own”?
Three accounts have so far been posited. First, Knobe et al. (2013) propose that the normative dimension rep-
resents certain abstract values associated with the corresponding descriptive elements. For example, the normative
dimension of scientist represents a value, such as the pursuit of empirically informed theories that is realized by its
descriptive components such as analyzing data, writing papers, and constructing theories. Second, focusing on
social roles mainly, Leslie (2015) proposes a distinction between typical functions of a role (e.g., philosophers teach
metaphysics, criticize existing metaphysical theories, and devise new metaphysical accounts) and an idealized social
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function. According to Leslie's view, the normative dimension of social roles represents their primary idealized
function; for instance, a true philosopher is concerned with the larger questions. Third, drawing on Leslie's proposal,
Del Pinal and Reuter (2017, ms) have argued and provided empirical evidence that the normative dimension of
social role concepts represents the commitment to fulfill the idealized function associated with that role. Thus, if
an artist is committed to producing works of esthetic value, then she satisfies the normative dimension of the
concept artist.
All three accounts create space for substantial individual disagreement concerning the content of the normative
dimension of dual character concepts. Both Leslie (2015) and Del Pinal and Reuter (2017) explain these differences
by referring to individual disagreements on what the respective idealized functions are. However, there are also
important constraints. Leslie predicts that secondary social functions can hardly be drawn upon to create a normative
dimension. Consequently, although caseworkers can be said to have the secondary social function of providing some
emotional support, this function cannot serve to be encoded as the normative dimension of caseworker. Relatedly,
Del Pinal and Reuter show that the commitment that features in their account must be directed to the function as
an end in itself, but not as means to another end. Accordingly, even if a person is committed to creating works of
esthetic value, that person fails to be a true artist if her commitment is a means to her ultimate aim of earning a
lot of money. Both Leslie's proposal and the commitment account by Del Pinal and Reuter make rather specific
proposals, but it is uncertain whether these accounts can be extended to artifact kinds, such as poem, sports car,
and emotion concepts. In contrast, Knobe et al.'s (2013) abstract value account certainly has the advantage to
encompass a wider range of concepts that have been identified to be dual character, but talk of abstract values seems
too vague.
Whereas many controversies remain in regard to detailing the normative content of dual character concepts, a
further issue arises as to if and how strongly both dimensions interact. To illustrate, imagine that Tom satisfies the
descriptive features of being a colleague by working for the same company and in the same field as his co‐workers
but fails to fulfill the normative requirements of being a colleague by not caring to support his co‐workers. Tom is
certainly not a true colleague. But is he a colleague? While this question has not so far been systematically investi-
gated, some empirical results suggest that the answer is at least in part negative. For instance, Knobe et al. (2013)
were able to show that many people do not regard a person to be an artist if she does not care about esthetic values;
and Phillips et al. (2017) demonstrated that many people refuse to attribute happiness to a person who feels satisfied
for morally dubious reasons. These results suggest a substantial impact of the normative component on seemingly
descriptive classification tasks.
2.2 | Normativity and social cognition
Empirical studies have shown that the encoding of a normative dimension is particularly salient for social role con-
cepts (Knobe et al., 2013) and gender terms (Leslie, 2015). For instance, expressions like “true philosopher” and “true
woman” seem to be highly acceptable and particularly frequent. This discovery has important implications for social
cognition because the extent to which people believe other persons to satisfy the normative dimension of certain
social roles is likely shaped by aspects such as gender, age, intelligence, and many other socially relevant factors.
These influences will in turn guide our thinking not only about social roles themselves but also about the ability of
members of certain social groups to fulfill their normative demands. Focusing on the interaction between gender
and the normative dimension of social role concepts, a series of papers has started to draw on their dual character
to investigate both normative generics and gender biases, which I will discuss in turn.
Generic sentences have been argued to express our primitive generalizations about the world (Leslie, 2008), and
some of them seem to express very substantial social biases (Haslanger, 2014; Wodak, Leslie, & Rhodes, 2015); e.g.,
“boys don't cry.” How can we understand and explain such generics and at the same time agree with statements like
“boys cry”? Leslie (2015) argues that the normative dimension of social role concepts may be a key determinant of
the meaning of such normative generics. She maintains that the “seemingly contradictory pair of generics is
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consistent because one picks up the normative sense of the term, and the other picks up the descriptive sense of the
term” (p. 7). Leslie's discussion of normative generics also allows her to make an interesting proposal of why some of
our concepts have a normative dimension. If the normative dimension of dual character concepts indeed encodes
idealized social functions, we can easily see why those concepts have such a dimension: It allows the preservation
of ideals that are supported by widespread agreement. Generic statements that seem to violate this proposal; e.g.,
a mother who tells her daughter that “true girls do not cry” can be argued “[to] say something false, but with the
intention of changing the widely held ideal concerning girls” (Leslie, 2015, p. 11).8 Whether or not Leslie's account
can handle other possible counterexamples needs to be seen. In any case, drawing on the dual nature of social role
concepts suggests that a more comprehensive theory of social generics can be given.
The investigation of the dual nature of social role concepts is also likely to provide additional tools for studying
gender biases. Experiments by Knobe et al. (2013) and Del Pinal and Reuter (2015) have shown that the modifier
“true” picks out the normative dimension of social role concepts; e.g., a true soldier is a person who satisfies some
abstract value that is associated with being a soldier. The results of these studies reveal that while some social roles
concepts have a strong normative dimension by default (artist, mechanic, soldier), other social role concepts (baker,
cashier, florist) only weakly represent a normative component. Recent work by Reuter and Del Pinal (n.d.) utilizes
the true‐modifier approach to investigate whether men and women are considered to equally satisfy the normative
aspects of social role concepts. The results of their studies indicate that there is a significant bias against women in
many gender‐associated social roles. More specifically, on average, people agree more strongly with a claim such as
“Jack is a true x” compared to “Mary is a true x,” when x is a gender‐associated social role like soldier, mechanic, florist,
nurse. In contrast, for gender‐neutral social roles like baker, editor, and musician, no difference was observed. The
exact nature of this bias is, of course, dependent on what is encoded in the normative dimension of social role con-
cepts. According to the account advanced by Del Pinal and Reuter (2017), the normative dimension of dual character
concepts represents the commitment to fulfill the function of the social roles. If their account proves correct, then the
observed effect is the result of a specific gender bias such that arbitrary male members are considered more commit-
ted to certain social roles than are female members. The results are certainly preliminary, but its results are suffi-
ciently robust to direct attention towards a gender bias that has so far not only been neglected (but see Bielby,
2000; Bielby & Baron, 1986) but also lacks any empirical foundation.9
3 | DUAL CHARACTER CONCEPTS, THICK CONCEPTS, AND NATURAL
KIND CONCEPTS
Dual character concepts form a class with unique properties. Two other kinds of concepts, however, appear to have
properties that are in some important respect similar to those of dual character concepts. While thick concepts
resemble dual character concepts in having a normative component, natural kind concepts seem to be structurally
similar to dual character concepts in sharing two different criteria for category membership. I discuss various similar-
ities and differences between these classes, starting with thick concepts.
3.1 | Thick concepts
Thick concepts not only describe certain states of affairs but also evaluate them positively or negatively. For instance,
while the statement “Sarah is willing to take risks” merely describes a certain character trait of Sarah, “Sarah is cou-
rageous” additionally evaluates her risk taking positively, whereas “Sarah is foolhardy” evaluates her willingness to
take risks negatively. Importantly, the terms “courageous” and “foolhardy” are descriptively richer than “great” or
“bad,” which merely evaluate but do not specify in which sense something is considered positively or negatively
(Väyrynen, 2016). Similar to discussions on dual character concepts, the most prominent debate on thick concepts
revolves around the question of how the descriptive and normative components are related. According to the
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standard account, it is not possible to disentangle the descriptive and evaluative components of these concepts
(Kirchin, 2010; Putnam, 2002; Williams, 1985), but see Elstein and Hurka (2009) or Väyrynen (2013) who have
argued against the anti‐disentanglement thesis.
Whereas the normative aspect of thick concepts is usually thought to be evaluative in character, I have argued
that the normativity of dual character concepts can be understood through its action‐ or reason‐guiding role. It is,
therefore, not entirely clear that both kinds of concepts are normative in the same sense.10 It seems that the evalu-
ative component of thick concepts can easily be given an action‐guiding interpretation: A woman who is courageous
is positively evaluated for her risk taking because we believe that she should be taking these risks (or that her behav-
ior is at least to be recommended), whereas a person who acts foolhardily is negatively evaluated for her risk taking,
because we think that she should not be taking those risks. It is less obvious, however, that a person or an object that
satisfies the normative dimension of a dual character concept is thereby also always evaluated in a positive or neg-
ative way. In fact, it seems highly questionable that expressions such as “true conservative” or “true soldier” must be
saying something either good or bad. I believe we can explain this possible lack of evaluative character by highlighting
that people can also take a neutral stance towards action‐guiding norms themselves. For instance, a person can
acknowledge that the action‐guiding norm of soldiers is to put country before self but nonetheless take a critical
or even neutral stance towards it. Certainly, more work is needed to detail the various aspects for which both thick
and dual character concepts can be said to be in part normative.
At least two crucial differences need to be noted between thick concepts and dual character concepts. First, on
all accounts, the normative component of thick concepts “merely” evaluates what the descriptive component refers
to and, hence, has no independent content in and of itself. Hence, the normative component precludes independent
categorization; e.g., it seems impossible to call Sarah courageous without also describing her as a risk‐taking
individual. Second, and relatedly, expressions of dual character concepts do not allow us to draw any inferences
about their evaluative valence. For example, hearing from Sam that Susan is an artist does not provide us with any
information on whether Sam looks favorably on Susan or not. The situation is markedly different with thick concepts:
When Sam calls Susan “courageous,” he expresses a clear pro‐attitude, unless additional contextual information is
provided (Blackburn, 1992; Hare, 1981).
Despite the fact that research on thick concepts has flourished during the last three decades, no empirical studies
seem to have been conducted in this area. This is surprising because “the claim that how people actually use their
normative concepts is an empirical question should not be controversial” (Tiberius, 2013, p. 222). Thus, by investigat-
ing the relation between thick concepts and dual character concepts empirically, much progress is to be expected.
Some of the connections between thick concepts and dual character concepts can be examined by analyzing con-
cepts that are both thick and dual character, e.g., friend and criminal. Studying thick concepts empirically also allows
us to examine possible ways in which the normative component of thick concepts and the normative component of
dual character concepts interact. This raises a host of interesting research questions: (i) Can we infer the strength of
the normative dimension of a dual character concept from the strength of its thickness? (ii) How do both classes of
concepts compare in terms of acceptability and independence of the normative component? (iii) How do people com-
pute the normative dimension of concepts given only its descriptive features?11
3.2 | Natural kind concepts
The standard depiction of natural kinds as having both superficial and core properties (Bird & Tobin, 2018) motivates
the idea that natural kind concepts also encode two independent dimensions for categorization. Accordingly, an
animal can be categorized as a tiger either if it fulfills some concrete superficial features like striped, carnivore, cat
of prey, etc. or if it has the right tiger essence, like having tiger DNA or being born of tiger parents. Famously, Putnam
(1975) has ruled out classification of natural kinds based on superficial properties, highlighting their core properties as
necessary for the identification of natural kinds. Empirical results by Knobe et al. (2013) support the claim that natural
kind terms do not show the characteristic dual character pattern when being empirically investigated. When people
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were asked to imagine some animal that looks like a tiger and seems to hunt like a tiger but is discovered to have
puma DNA, they tended to disagree with statement (a) in the “two‐senses” task:
a. There is a sense in which that animal is clearly a tiger.
b. However, when you think about what it really means to be a tiger, you would have to say that it is not really a
tiger.
In contrast with dual character concepts, for which there exist two ways of categorization, natural kinds seem to
be only identified when the item is believed to carry the respective essential property. The answers that Knobe et al.
(2013) recorded are consistent with well‐established results in the literature on psychological essentialism (Gelman &
Kremer, 1991; Rangel & Keller, 2011). The clear distinction between dual character concepts and natural kind con-
cepts, however, has been challenged in regard to both the properties of dual character concepts and natural kind
terms. In a recent paper, Tobia, Newman, and Knobe (n.d.) tested people's intuitions for both the famous Twin Earth
thought experiment (Putnam, 1973) and other variations of that thought experiment. The aim of these studies was to
determine whether people share the standard philosophical intuition that natural kinds are defined by their essences,
e.g., the Putnamian intuition that a liquid is water only if it consists of H2O molecules. Their results put pressure on
the widely held intuition that the identity conditions of natural kinds are necessarily constituted by essential proper-
ties. Most participants, in fact, thought that there is a sense in which the liquid onTwin Earth is water but also a sense
that it is not. Similar results were obtained for other natural kinds, including tigers, salmon, and gold (see also Bloom,
2007; Machery & Seppälä, 2011). If natural kind concepts indeed show a dual character pattern, then the effect
under investigation is perhaps part of a much wider phenomenon. Such a conclusion is further underpinned by results
from Del Pinal and Reuter (2015). Their studies empirically investigated the degree to which the normative dimension
of dual character concepts is a central criterion, where a dimension or feature is more central, the more other fea-
tures depend on it (see also Del Pinal, Madva, & Reuter, 2017). If it is central, it is present in most of our thoughts
and judgments concerning the denoted class. Using Sloman, Love, and Ahn's (1998) “surprise paradigm” to measure
centrality, e.g., asking participants how surprised they would be if they encountered an artist who does not care
about creating inspiring works of art, they were able to show that the normative dimension is not only loosely asso-
ciated with the concept but rather a central feature of its structure.
These results suggest that dual character concepts might also be seen as a special kind of prototype in which the
normative dimension is not only a highly weighted feature but also a central feature.12 Accordingly, dual character
concepts have a kind of a hybrid make‐up since they encode both statistical information and dependency relations
between the features of the concept. However, such hybrid models have recently come under attack by theoretical
as well as empirical work by Machery and Seppälä (2011) and Machery (2014). They argue that if concepts are indeed
hybrids that consist in a prototypical structure but also encode an essential or theory‐based core, we should expect
people's judgments in simple classification tasks to be coordinated;i.e., deliberations about whether an object or a kind
belongs to a certain class should not lead to conflicting verdicts. However, their empirical studies show that many
people happily endorse the view that there is a sense in which, e.g., tomatoes are vegetables but also that tomatoes
are not vegetables. In other words, it looks as if prototypical and theory‐based information leads to uncoordinated
verdicts. They conclude that these empirical results favor the heterogeneity hypothesis or concept pluralism (see also
Machery, 2005, and Weiskopf, 2009), according to which there are several conceptual structures for the same cat-
egory. The rather unequivocal data coming from studies on dual character concepts seems to provide further support
for concept pluralism. One might, however, challenge the coordination criterion on either theoretical (Vicente &
Martínez‐Manrique, 2014) or empirical grounds. On Knobe et al.'s view, for instance, the normative dimension rep-
resents abstract values that are realized by the more concrete features of the descriptive dimension. Hence, at least,
in some regard, the descriptive and normative information seems to be coordinated.
Both the conflicting evidence researchers have found in regard to whether natural kind concepts show a dual
character pattern, as well as the empirical results on the centrality of the normative dimension of established dual
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character concepts, underscore the need for further empirical work. Such work will be crucial in establishing whether
a unified account can be developed that encompasses both natural kind concepts and dual character concepts
(Newman & Knobe, forthcoming). Assuming dual character concepts to be essentialist‐like concepts has important
implications not only for accounts of conceptual change but also for individual acts of categorization. Since the nor-
mative dimension is a central feature of dual character concepts, changes to the normative dimension will have sub-
stantial effects on its descriptive features. For instance, if we change the normative dimension of colleague from
supporting one's co‐workers to competing with them, this will eventually affect the rest of the descriptive criteria
of colleague. These are fundamentally important implications that need to be tackled in future studies.
4 | CONCLUSION
The study of dual character concepts is in its infancy: The first full‐length paper on this subject appeared only five
years ago. Since then, this research area has flourished as can be witnessed by the wealth of new publications on this
topic. In this article, I have surveyed some of the current accounts on the content and structure of dual character con-
cepts, as well as their relation to thick concepts and natural kinds concepts. The discovery of an independent norma-
tive dimension raises some formidable challenges to the neat distinction between the descriptive and normative
realm for many concepts that many have thought to be purely descriptive.
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ENDNOTES
1 Recently, experimental studies have shown that normative evaluations influence the application of what are usually
considered to be purely descriptive concepts. The concepts of cause and intentional action are probably the most widely
discussed cases in point; see, e.g., Knobe (2003), Alicke (2008), and Knobe and Fraser (2008).
2 For example, by calling a woman “generous,” we not only describe her as willing to give money or support beyond what is
expected, but we also evaluate her positively for being willing to give that amount of support.
3 Leslie (2015) argues that dual character concepts have their distinct features because they are in some sense social
concepts.
4 For example, we may say that a person truly believes p only if that person acts in accordance with p.
5 Purely thick concepts like prisoner, or kitsch, do not have an independent normative dimension and hence do not pass the
“two‐senses” test. Some concepts like friend are both thick and dual character.
6 Examining other modifiers may deliver important insights, including the modifier real (Malt & Paquet, 2013), as well as
modifiers that have been suggested by Leslie (2015) but which have not so far been investigated empirically, e.g., “Linda
is twice the scientist that Tom is” and “Sam is more of an artist than Sarah.”
7 For discussions on cashing out the normativity of concepts in terms of their action‐ and reason‐guiding role, see Williams
(1985) and Wedgwood (forthcoming).
8 Del Pinal and Reuter (2017) provide an alternative explanation of why social role concepts encode commitments to
idealized functions: That information is crucial to predict the future social roles and role‐dependent behavior of others.
For instance, if you know that a teenage boy is committed to creating esthetically deep work, then you can predict that
he will strive to become an artist. Such a prediction is less reliable if you merely know that this teenage boy is skilled at
painting pictures and working with watercolors.
9 The potential for studying biases is, of course, not merely restricted to gender biases but can be extended to racial and
other biases.
10 I would like to thank a reviewer of this journal for raising this worry.
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11 This question is particularly relevant, as it has been argued that people who do not grasp the evaluative component of
thick concepts lack conceptual competence (Väyrynen, 2011). The same, it seems, cannot be said about dual character
concepts. Thus, it might be possible that conceptually competent people entertain concepts like artist and scientist
without encoding any normative component.
12 See also Hampton (2006) who calls such structures “theory‐based prototypes.”
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